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ments a decline in inﬂuence of psychoanalytic ideas in legal thinking. He notes “the fundamental similarity
that both litigation and psychotherapy involve recollections of past events”, buttressing his argument with
eight parallels between the two. In this article we take up Burt's theme, ﬁrst noting the relationship between
therapeutic jurisprudence and psychoanalytic concepts before presenting an outline for a psychoanalytical un-
derstanding of the judicial role.We then consider the litigation process from the linked perspectives of therapeu-
tic jurisprudence and psychoanalysis before closing with a reﬂection on the eight parallels elaborated by Burt.
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The emergence of therapeutic judging (TJ) can be linked to the
growing acceptance of the notion that justice is a broad concept (Legg,
2013, pp. 155–166) and that it may be achieved through collaborative
means rather than solely through the actions of an independent, even
handed judge. The evolution of current models of judging can be linked
to changing perspectives on justice as represented by justice imagery
throughout the last few centuries (Resnik and Curtis, 2012, pp. 3–10);
and in its current incarnation as noted by Robert Burt (in this issue),
through an acceptance that the dynamics of conﬂict may sometimes re-
quire that all of those involved in a dispute work together to build an
outcome with the support of a judge, and where the judge may engage
in a more therapeutic manner.
This is not to suggest that the law is any less relevant within the jus-
tice system or that it cannot be combined with a TJ approach. Ian Craib
(a sociologist who also trained as a psychoanalyst) says of psychoana-
lytic therapy that its aim is to help people, “contain their emotions in
order to be able to think” (Craib, 2001, p. 5). In many ways the law,
and themany practitioners whowork within the legal system (the law-
yers, judges and others), provide a similar function. Law can help us to
organise our relationships, from the personal to the professional, know-
ing that we need not recreate many basic boundaries and rules of be-
haviour. It provides a framework within which we can pursue ourourdin), rmcornes@essex.ac.uk
es, R., Implications for therape
nal Journal of Law and Psychiagoals. If we ﬁnd ourselves in signiﬁcant conﬂict, the legal system can
be used to assist to settle or ﬁnalise the dispute.
TJ does not displace these important objectives. However, the emer-
gence of TJ models can be linked to a partial rejection of the notion that
judgingmust require a hierarchical response. In TJ, although substantive
legalmodels and the rule of laware present, a focus onmore therapeutic
interventions that support learning and change is invoked to support
outcomes that are directed at more lasting resolution. By fostering
self-determination and respect, the judge, the court and all relevant par-
ticipants, are directed at encouraging transformation, often over a peri-
od of time.
Whilst judicial behaviour in the context of TJ has often been ex-
plored in a theoretical sense, and there are numerous examples of suc-
cessful TJ programmes, there has been little focus on the implications of
psychoanalytical perspectives on judicial behaviours for TJ. As Burt has
noted, there are however numerous parallels, and whilst many judicial
behaviours may have resulted from frustration with the inadequacies
presented bymore traditional hierarchical judgingmodels, other judges
may have been inﬂuenced by an increasing emphasis on procedural jus-
tice (Lind& Tyler, 1988; Thibaut, 1978), communication skills, aswell as
the increasing exploration of the expansion of the judicial role to include
management, conﬂict resolution and administration (Sourdin & Zariski,
2013). However, as Wexler (in press) has noted, TJ involves more than
these expanded foci in that it has a primary goal which is “to apply and
incorporate insights and ﬁndings from the psychology, criminology, and
social work literature to the legal system” (Kaiser & Holtfreter, 2015,
p. 4; Wexler, in press). This application requires consideration of a
vast literature in each of these areas and therefore incorporates a
much larger analysis of behaviours, systems, processes and people.utic judging (TJ) of a psychoanalytical approach to the judicial role —
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courts where TJ ﬂourishes) there has been limited engagementwith the
notion that more effective forms of judging may require both, broader
understandings of literature from outside legal academic circles, as
well as a judicial capacity to use more empathic connective approaches
and collaborative understandings and skills.
Whilst the exploration of the evolving judicial role can be undertak-
en in the context of the experimentation that has emergedwhere TJ ap-
proaches have been utilised, a focus on TJ also supports consideration of
potential changes to the judicial role and how these changes might be
evaluated. At the most basic level, TJ requires a surrounding structure
that supports:
(1) ongoing judicial intervention, (2) close monitoring of and
immediate response to behaviour, (3) the integration of treatment
services with judicial case processing, (4) multidisciplinary involve-
ment, and (5) collaboration with community-based and govern-
ment organizations (Kaiser & Holtfreter, 2015, pp. 55–56).
Where TJ is introduced into traditional court arrangements, the psy-
chodynamics of the traditional court room and structures can pose sig-
niﬁcant challenges for therapeutic judging (TJ), and, as we discuss
below, involve modes of interaction – part-object relating – which are
distinctly anti-therapeutic. In addition, another potential area of difﬁ-
culty is that some of the lead legal actors, the lawyers, and judge, or
judges, operate from distinct psyches which, constructed from law
school onwards, embody ways of seeing the world which present a di-
rect challenge to reshaping the therapeutic orientation of judicial
processes.
In respect of the judicial role, a ﬂuid, responsive and dynamic ap-
proach that draws upon and reﬂects on psychoanalytical advances is
also required in TJ. The evolving nature of this role has seldom been
the subject of commentary, and the parallels with developments in
more general psychotherapeutic approaches, are, as Burt has noted, sig-
niﬁcant and may suggest future areas for the development of TJ under-
standings. The value to TJ of engagingwith a psychoanalytic perspective
on the courtroom, and those within it, is that it opens up new ways to
view, and considers revisions to, judicial and litigation processes. The
psychoanalytical approach, combined with TJ principles and experience,
has the potential to be used to explain, diagnose, and suggest remedies
for, aspects of the orthodox judicial process which may have detrimen-
tal effects on those involved in such processes.
2. Therapeutic jurisprudence and TJ
The emergence of therapeutic jurisprudence which underpins TJ is
directly linked to the establishment of problem solving courts and the
development of restorative justice theory over the past three decades.
Essentially, the approaches were initially directed as a law reformmea-
sure with TJ supporting an understanding that law could be used in ei-
ther a therapeutic or non-therapeutic manner (Magner, 1997):
It [therapeutic jurisprudence] is an interdisciplinary approach to le-
gal scholarship that has a law reform agenda. Therapeutic jurispru-
dence seeks to assess the therapeutic and anti-therapeutic
consequences of law and how it is applied. It also seeks to affect legal
change designed to increase the former and diminish the latter.
(Winick & Wexler, 2002, p. 479).
In addition, the growth in therapeutic jurisprudence clearly originat-
ed from a recognition that traditional court processes failed to deal with
a range of behaviours. In this regard, traditional courts were perceived
to be.
… recycling problems, the reoccurrence of which traditional inter-
ventions did not succeed in bringing to a halt. The traditional judicial
model addressed the symptoms, but not the underlying problem.Please cite this article as: Sourdin, T., & Cornes, R., Implications for therape
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ing repeated judicial intervention. (Winick, 2003, p. 1060).
Research relating to therapeutic approaches has consistently found
that these approaches may not only result in reduced recidivism in re-
spect of family, criminal and other conﬂicts but can also play a critical
role in enhancing conﬂict resolution and social skills whilst addressing
underlying problems through the use of collaborative approaches.
In terms of the impact on judges, this approach has required that
judges change the way that they judge and operate in courts. One com-
mentator suggested that “Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a chal-
lenge to judicial ofﬁcers. From its perspective judicial ofﬁcers simply
should not sit back and uncritically apply court processes that have
been handed down over many years.” (King, 2003a, 2003b). TJ requires
not just higher levels of engagement but different forms of engagement.
Further, TJ presents a challenge to the classical construction of the judi-
cial psyche (elaborated in the following section).
Initially, the broad parameters of TJwere not only intended to support
interdisciplinary approaches, they were intended to foster a “mental
health approach to law” that would use the “the tools of the behavioral
sciences to assess law's therapeutic impact” and thereby promote psy-
chological health and well-being (Winick & Wexler, 2002, p. 479).
These approaches were directed at least initially at criminal cases (often
involving young people) and family disputes. The extension of TJ through
the development of specialist courts such as drug courts (Rottman, 2000),
indigenous courts (Marchetti & Ransley, 2014) initially suggested that
TJ approaches would be limited to those courts which required more
reﬂexive cultural responses (which acknowledged differing values and
approaches), where a rehabilitative component was present and impor-
tantly where some ongoing supervision and ﬂexibility in approach
were required to ensure that changes could be adequately supported.
The rapid growth of specialist “problem solving” courts in theUnited
States (US), that nownumbermore than 2500 (Wolf, 2009)was accom-
panied by a focus on the evaluation of outcomes (see for example,
Berman, Feinblatt, & Glazer, 2005) and the development of policies,
core principles and practicemodels. Themore recent extension of TJ ap-
proaches beyond specialist courts as well as the development of more
specialist courts hasmeant that TJ is nowused in respect of a far broader
spectrum of legal disputes (Wexler, 2008) and incorporates the notion
that TJmay lead to better quality outcomes and higher levels of satisfac-
tion with the justice system (Toohey & Toohey, 2011). Therapeutic
judging in this respect is considered to support access to justice by en-
abling and supporting clearer decision making within courts and by
supporting greater conﬁdence in the justice system. In this broader ar-
ticulation therapeutic jurisprudence is perceived to: “… focus[es] atten-
tion on this previously underappreciated aspect, humanising the law
and concerning itself with the human, emotional and psychological
side of law and the legal process.” (Toohey & Toohey, 2011, p. 309).
The extension of TJ approaches beyond problem solving or specialist
courts has not occurred without some criticism, with some questioning
their constitutional validity (Australia, Duffy, 2011). At the same time,
attempts to “mainstream” TJ have led to the development of non-adver-
sarial law theory and educational programmes speciﬁcally oriented to-
wards therapeutic jurisprudence (King, Freiberg, Batagol, & Hyams,
2014). These more recent developments have fostered the articulation
of a broader deﬁnition of therapeutic jurisprudence that recognises
that “What is important in one area of law may be less so in another
area, and consequently a broad deﬁnition is required to cover the
ﬁeld” (King, 2008, pp. 1115–1116). It has been recently noted that:
TJ has been applied to diverse areas of the law.While its principal ap-
plications have been in mental health law, criminal law, judging,
legal practice and legal education, it has also been applied in
international law, contract law, tort law, coronial law, family law, ad-
ministrative law and workers compensation law. (Evans & King,
2012, p. 720).utic judging (TJ) of a psychoanalytical approach to the judicial role —
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involved in a court process and supports not only judges but also court
staff, legal representatives and other key people (ﬁnancial counsellors,
mental health practitioners and others) to adopt both amore collabora-
tive and holistic approach to consider the well-being of those involved
in conﬂict. Such an approach requires not only a focus on skills and pro-
cesses but also on ethical arrangements (Evans & King, 2012). In con-
trast, therapeutic judging (TJ), as used in this article, is focussed more
on the speciﬁc role of the judge and the nature of the judicial engage-
ment within the crucible (or perhaps more correctly in the TJ sense —
the environment) of the court.
TJ in this sense is concerned not only with procedural justice ap-
proaches which can be linked to respect, dignity, explanation, voice,
participation, acknowledgement and fair decision making (Greenberg,
1993; Lind & Tyler, 1988) but is also linked to an understanding of the
importance of interactive and sometimes disruptive approaches within
a court setting thatmay focus less on authority andmore on recognition
of the participants aswhole-objects, and empowerment. It is thesemore
therapeutic interventions that have sometimes raised concerns in re-
spect of the judicial role where it has been suggested that there can be
additional complexities raised in respect of the judicial role in that fa-
miliarity can be an issue and that open court processes can impact on
people particularly in the context of public shaming and conﬁdentiality
(Lyons, 2013, p. 412).
In addition, the TJ role requires that a judge demonstrate leadership
skills and rolemodelling in a broader sense to support amore collabora-
tive and problem solving environment. Winick has noted that:
Not only is the judge a leading actor in the therapeutic drama, but al-
so the courtroom itself becomes a stage for the acting out of many
crucial scenes. On this stage, the judge also assumes the role of direc-
tor, coordinating the roles of many of the actors, providing a needed
motivation for how they will play their parts, and inspiring them to
play them well. (Winick, 2003, p. 1060).
As Burt has noted, the reimagining of the therapist role in the second
half of the twentieth century involves a progression from “an authori-
tarian conception of the analyst's role, in which he was all-knowing
and his patient was expected to defer to his superior scientiﬁc pro-
nouncements.” In a similar vein, the developments in TJ challenge the
traditionally constructed judicial psyche – which we discuss next – so
that more authoritarian and hierarchical styles have been consumed
and overtaken by a more useful collaborative and supportive decision
making approach. In this sense, therapeutic jurisprudence requires
that judges when following a TJ approach, operate both within legal
boundaries, but also,within the court in a non-paternalistic and non-co-
ercive manner (King & Auty, 2005).3. A psychoanalysis of judging
Robert Burt (in this issue) opens his discussion by consideringwhy a
wider interest in psychoanalysis ebbed and ﬂowed, in the United States,
from 1963 onwards (after an amusing account of themesmeric certain-
ty with which Anna Freud tranquilised the young Burt and associates).
In the context of psychoanalysis and the discipline of law there has ar-
guably been more ebb than ﬂow. Resort to psychoanalytic concepts in
relation to the law still remains a less than mainstream pursuit. The
title of “Law & Psychoanalysis” is directed at a small cadre of commen-
tators. Furthermore, with some exceptions (Aristodemou, 2014) the in-
terdisciplinarymixing of law and psychoanalysis remainsmore popular
in the US than say, the United Kingdom.
In his contribution to this issue, Burt lists three reasons for the gen-
eral decline of psychoanalytical ideas as an inﬂuence in the United
States. To them, in relation to the discipline of the law, we can add the
issue noted by Sheleff, also in this journal, in 1986, and still we suspect
true in large part today, that “neither lawyers nor psychoanalysts havePlease cite this article as: Sourdin, T., & Cornes, R., Implications for therape
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seek cross fertilisation” ((1986), p. 154, quoting Ehrenzweig (1972,
p. 157)). Burt, an early adopter, of course, was one of the exceptions.
Despite themodest resurgence in law and psychoanalytical scholar-
shipmore generally, none of it has considered directly, comprehensive-
ly, how Freud's vocabulary and grammar of the psychemight be used to
explain the classic concept of the judge:what is thenature of the judicial
psyche? How does it operate? Nor, with very limited exceptions, has
there been detailed consideration of the psychodynamics of the judicial
process (Shaibani, 1999) — a topic with self-evident potential to con-
tribute to work on TJ.
Whilst some of the lead legal realists drew on psychoanalytic
concepts – Jerome Frank wrote his Law and the Modern Mind (Frank,
1930) subsequent to having undergone analysis (Schauer, 2010,
p. 110) – there has still been a tendency to link the rejection of formal-
ism to an embrace of the judge as disguised active policy maker (using
legal reasoning as a cloak). For realists:
The alleged cognitive differences between judges (or lawyers) and
the rest of humanity are exaggerated, with judges engaged in forms
of cognition not appreciably different from those of the human spe-
cies in general, a species of which judges are of course a part.
(Schauer, 2010, p. 111).
Freud, and psychoanalytical concepts, whilst appearing in Realist
and CLS theorising, (for e.g., Caudill, 1991), have the potential though
to support a much richer understanding of the legal psyche (Klein and
Mitchell (2010). Some of the psychological work on judges has started
to engage with these issues (Rachlinski et al., 2009; Vidmar, 2011), sug-
gesting that there is something in legal trainingwhich enables people to
put aside instinctive biases, yet:
Much of the existing research on the psychology of judging takes the
Realist view of judging as axiomatic [with all its assumptions about
judges as explicit – almost conscious – policy actors], but that con-
clusion is hardly inevitable. (Schauer, 2010, p. 113).
Arguably, psychoanalytical concepts can be used as a novel embar-
kation point to explaining judicial behaviour and court processes,
rather than merely as additional material to add to existing legal
theory.
The ﬁrst stop on a psychoanalytical journey into law, and judicial
processes, might beginwith the psyche of the lawyer (comprising a dis-
tinct legal super-ego and legal ego), and, later in their (common law) ca-
reer, with that of the judge. The judge's legal super-ego, additional to
their personal super-ego, and constructed through legal training, is the
repository of legal knowledge, not just learnt legal rules, but also the
broader cultural experience of the law. Like the personal super-ego,
the legal super-ego is built up over time by taking in the thinking and
views which run through generations of legal thinkers. As Holmes
(1881, p. 5) put it: “The life of the lawhas not been logic: it has been ex-
perience. ... The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.”
The legal ego is the place fromwhich lawyers and judges learn to ap-
proach and analyse the world in legal terms, obeying the commands of
their legal super-egos. Like the personal ego it is a place fromwhich one
speaks as one's self, but in this case, one's legal self. When running in
“legal mode” – in the role of lawyer, or judge – the conscious personal
super-ego and ego are set aside, though that is not to say that impulses
from those parts of the psyche do not play a role in legal reasoning. Their
inﬂuence though comes at the level of the unconscious.
The role of the unconscious and the phantastic reasoning explains
how, whilst staying true to the judicial oath – that cases are decided
by the law – a judge's personal self can in fact play a role.Whilst lawyers
and judges can enforce the bifurcation above the line of consciousness,
the degree to which it is effective beneath the line of consciousnessutic judging (TJ) of a psychoanalytical approach to the judicial role —
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cause, as Freud (1991, p. 139) said, the:
Unconsciousness is a regular and inevitable phase in the processes
constituting our psychical activity; every psychical act begins as an
unconscious one, and itmay either remain so or go ondeveloping in-
to consciousness, according to whether it meets resistance or not.
Thus, asmuch as a judge honestly claims to be operating consciously
from their legal super-ego and ego, there will still be inﬂuences from
their personal super-ego and ego beneath the membrane of conscious-
ness. And in their unconscious another reasoning process operates: that
of phantasy. Isaacs (1948, pp. 95 & 80) characterised phantasy as, “the
primary content of unconscious mental processes”: “Phantasy is (in
theﬁrst instance) themental corollary, the psychic representative, of in-
stinct. There is no impulse, no instinctual urge or response which is not
experienced as unconscious phantasy.”
Every judge's phantasies, or in Isaac's terms, instincts, of justice,
shaped by their life experiences, will play a role at the unconscious
level, inﬂuencing how they consciously apply legal rules. Phantastic rea-
soning operates to meld the inclinations of the judge's legal super-ego
and ego with that of their personal super-ego and ego, producing a syn-
thesis which ultimately emerges to consciousness where it (the conclu-
sion to the problem before the judge) is articulated consistently with
learnt legal rules.
The tempering of conscious legal detachment by unconscious judi-
cial phantasies is part of what makes legal reasoning generally accept-
able. Phantastic mixing in the unconscious ensures that legal
reasoning is tethered to a judge's humanity; it ensures that the “quality
of mercy is not strained”, and that the application of legal rules is sea-
soned by the judge's life experience.1
The ﬁnal component of a psychoanalysis of judging concerns how
lawyers and judges cope with the challenge posed by operating from
two psyches, especially when those psyches may have conﬂicting reac-
tions to the facts of a case, as for example when a defence lawyer puts
the prosecution to proof, potentially securing the freedom of a client
they know to have done the deed in question, or when a judge, presid-
ing in similar circumstances, must provide a fair trial— both behaviours
required by a legal system operating according to the rule of law. Two
further psychoanalytical concepts are relevant here: the defences of
splitting, and repression.
First, in relation to splitting, not only are “schizoid ways of relating...
never given up completely” but also they play a crucial role in enabling
legal thinking (Bott Spillius et al., 2011, p. 64). For lawyers such modes
of relating are implicitly encouraged as an aspect of legal training; nec-
essary to allow a person to reason as a lawyer. Splitting buttresses the
dual structure (of the legal self and personal self). It helps to control ten-
sionswhichwould otherwise arise (and could cripple legal thinking) by
removing from the inner world objects which would attract the dismay
of the personal super-ego and ego. It allows the lawyer or judge to hold
within, andworkwith, only those aspects of the litigantwhich are legal-
ly relevant. Both lawyers and judges train to switch off their personal
emotional responses (Klein, 1946, p. 105).
As theUK SupremeCourt's ﬁrst President, Lord Phillips (BBC4, 2011)
has said, “you need objectivity, you can't afford to let you own feelings
or emotions take charge.” The splitting defence operates to allow the
lawyer or judge to “both know and not know” the litigant at the same
time (Bott Spillius, p. 492). In the standard clinical setting splitting in
maturity is more generally associated with a pathology; “patients who
split can become cut off from aspects of themselves, for example they
may be unaware of their feelings and their thoughts can becomediscon-
nected from one another” (Bott Spillius, p. 74, discussing case studies in
Klein, 1946). Yet, for the judge some splitting is necessary to ensure1 See Portia's speech on mercy in Shakespeare's, The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Sc1,
ll2125–46.
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object within, seeing litigants whole, would cause conﬂict in traditional
court settings. Therapeutic judging approaches present a challenge to
this classic model because they may require a far wider evaluation of
the disputants' circumstances, than would traditionally be undertaken.
The other defence mechanism judges rely on is repression which
Freud described as: “the most stable and highly developed defence”,
available against the “arousal of anxiety or unpleasure in the system
conscious and conscious ego” (Freud, 1991, p. 521 & 519). In the topo-
graphic model repression stops ideas moving from the unconscious to
the conscious; in the structural model the “dynamic interplay between
the psychic agencies” achieves the same censoring, inhibiting function
(Freud, 1991, p. 519). In both the purpose remains the same: “the pre-
vention of the arousal of anxiety or unpleasure” (Freud, 1991, p. 519).
There is a link between the two defences. In Klein's (1952, p. 86)
view: “the mechanism of splitting underlies repression.”
4. Connecting judicial and therapeutic concerns
It follows from the preceding discussion that the orthodox, non-TJ
orientated, litigation process is one of part-object relations. Part-object
relating is implicit in for example the splitting defence lawyers and
judges rely on in order to think as lawyers and judges. A normal experi-
ence of object relating in adult life will be to people as whole objects.
Even when we relate to people as part-objects (for e.g., doctor to pa-
tient, lecturer to student) an expected aspect of the interpersonal be-
haviour will be the recognition of the contextual relevance of each
person's humanity, a preparedness to couch the part-object rationale
for the interaction in terms of the wholeness of each actor (Gomez,
1997, p. 1–2).
The classic adversarial litigation model though entails stripping the
parties of their whole story and setting it within the framework of a
cause of action. Only those facts which are strictly relevant to the legal
principles concerned will be of interest to the court. At the heart of
this litigation process is the “judge”, a presiding part-object comprised
of legal super-ego and ego – their personal self cut off – and subject,
as are all in the courtroom, to the legal social super-ego requiring the
role behaviour of “judge”. Clients and lawyers alike relate to the judge
in part-object terms. The requirement of part-object relating, for the
judge, is captured by the judicial oath, “I will do right to all manner of
people after the laws and usages of this realm,without fear or favour, af-
fection or ill will.”; that is., I will deal with all before me on the basis of
what the law says is relevant, not on the basis of the totality of their
circumstances.
Litigation lawyers will be familiar with clients' bafﬂement that sur-
rounding aspects of a disputed event which seem emotionally connect-
ed to the event, are not, in legal terms relevant to the articulation of the
event in the documents launching or defending a case. For this reason,
non-lawyers involved in litigation, unless experienced in the law, may
ﬁnd the process dehumanising, at least disconcerting, and often
distressing. In fact themore a case seems to call for a “human” response
(usually cases with the potential for a high emotional charge), themore
likely that phraseswill appear in a judgement along the lines of, “I stress
that I am not concernedwith the policy of X in this case;my task is sole-
ly to apply the law.” Opening his discussion in Re A, concerning the sep-
aration of co-joined twins – an operation which will bring to one of the
prospect of life, but to the other, death – Sir Alan Ward (Re A, 2000,
p. 155) says: “This court is a court of law, not of morals, and our task
has been to ﬁnd, and our duty is then to apply the relevant principles
of law to the situation before us - a situation which is quite unique.”
The TJ approach, by contrast, requires empathic communication and
the creation andmaintenance of a connection, where possible, between
all of those involved in the conﬂict, as whole objects with attention
being given to factors that may not be “legally relevant”. Whilst this in-
volves supportive mechanisms such as a team building and collabora-
tive approach, the use of review meetings and an emphasis ofutic judging (TJ) of a psychoanalytical approach to the judicial role —
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ing judicial authority engages and connects with people in a way that is
not only less authoritarian but may also be more “democratic” (Burt, in
this issue).Whilst it has been suggested that “very standing of a judicial
ofﬁcer as a person of authority can help promote change” (King & Auty,
2005, p. 73) there is much more required of those involved in TJ. In
criminal courts, for example, not only must the process require the ap-
plication of sentencing arrangements and supports that encourage
treatment and growth, but such growth and compliancewith outcomes
is realised through judicial behaviours that are motivating and support-
ive of self realisation. Connecting with people is a critical component
and as such more authoritative and paternalistic approaches must be
used with great care.
Whilst Burt suggests that “Judges must redeﬁne their conception of
themselves as promoting free conversation, exploration and empathic
identiﬁcation amongst estranged adversaries rather than deﬁnitively
designating winners and losers” (Burt, in this issue), in the TJ area,
they must grapple with the dual role that includes “therapeutic inter-
ventions, where judges both punish participants (revoking bail) and
act as their therapist (asking how they felt after a relapse)” (Lyons,
2013, p. 417). This role duality, whilst resting on similar mechanisms,
is a modiﬁcation of the traditional psychical bifurcation of the classic
“judge” discussed above, and is made possible partly because the over-
riding values of TJ include a recognition that the “participation of people
in allmatters and decisions concerning them ﬂows from the recognition
that the principles of equality and non-discrimination are fundamental
and universally applicable” (Weller, 2011, p. 93). Adjusting their behav-
iour in this waymoves them frompart-object relatingwith those before
them towards whole-object relations.
The TJ approach requires a shift towards an interactive form of jus-
tice where respect is critical and where interactions are both empathic
and supportive. Whilst this may require attention to elements of proce-
dural justice (that promote digniﬁed and respectful communication)
and at the most basic level relates to communication arrangements:
“Body language, the tone andmanner of speech and how the judicial of-
ﬁcer acts are also important. Sarcasm, for example, is unlikely to pro-
mote a therapeutic interaction” (King, 2003a, 2003b), it also requires
interactions that support self-esteem.
Such interactions require understandings about self and others as
well as the nature of the changed judicial role. It has been noted for ex-
ample that “a judgemust intelligently attend to his or her own emotions
in order to maximise the chance of participant rehabilitation and posi-
tive behavioural change” (Duffy, 2011, p. 420). In addition, the
questioning and interactions require that in TJ theremust be acceptance
andunderstanding of the behaviour of all of thosewithin the court and a
higher tolerance of ambiguity: “If a problem-solving court judge is pre-
pared to address the root cause of an individual's offending, they need to
ﬁguratively enter and understand theworld inwhich that offending has
occurred” (Duffy, 2011, p. 395).
Empathic connections can arguably create some issues for those
working in a therapeutic jurisprudence environment particularly if a
collaborative and problem solving team arrangement is not aligned
with the need for and the desirability of more supportive and less au-
thoritarian interactions. The potential judicial difﬁculties in such a situ-
ation are twofold. Not only is a judge required – and psychically
constructed – to be impartial and independent, a judge must also con-
sider the institutional integrity of the court and the justice system
(Duffy, 2011).
By no means are these goals irreconcilable and a number of thera-
peutic jurisprudence commentators would suggest that deeper and
more meaningful connected interactions need not have an adverse im-
pact on the independent and impartial role of a judge (as with a thera-
pist) and that such a pattern of interaction may support the integrity of
the system in any event by supporting a more human and humane jus-
tice approach. Achieving these goals across a broader range of courts
(and beyond specialist courts) will likely require a re-appraisal of notPlease cite this article as: Sourdin, T., & Cornes, R., Implications for therape
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law school onwards. The classic model of the legal/judicial psyche
outlined above is not one which is naturally turned towards a TJ
approach – though it clearly could be, and indeed as experience of TJ
in action shows, can be. The argument for considering a wider re-
appraisal of legal and judicial training is strengthened by the eight par-
allels which Burt carefully elaborates as existing between the roles of
judge and therapist, parallels to which we now turn.5. Reﬂections on Robert Burt's analysis
Robert Burt's analysis of the parallels between legal and psychoana-
lytical processes is especially supportive of the developments in TJ over
the past two decades. It also provides support for the continuing devel-
opment of therapeutic jurisprudence. His ﬁrst two parallels note that
both litigation and psychoanalysis entail recollections of past events,
which in both cases involves deliberative re-enactments before a person
whowas not involved in the past events (the therapist or judge). In this
regard, Burt suggests that in both contexts “the very process of recollec-
tion has the same goal.” In view of the past discussion, it is suggested
that the goals of psychotherapy and the traditional model of litigation,
as well as the modes of relating between those engaged in the process-
es, differ perhaps more than Burt contemplates. In relation to TJ ap-
proaches however, the parallel is much clearer.
In this context, the fourth parallel that is noted must also be consid-
ered: “both litigative and psychotherapeutic processes do not focus on
the past for its own sake but for the purpose of charting a course for fu-
ture conduct.” A crucial difference between psychoanalysis and litiga-
tion, concerns which aspects of the past are permitted into the
present. A psychotherapist – pitted against the analysand's resistance
– seeks as much of the past as is possible, making no judgement as to
relevancy (indeed, that which the analysand perceives as irrelevant is
quite likely to be anything but, and to be settled on with interest by
their therapist). In the traditional litigation setting a judge seeks, and
is presented with by the parties' lawyers, only that which is legally rele-
vant, according to the rules evidence. This will often deliver a quite par-
tial picture (the one apt to bafﬂe the non-legally trained layperson).
Certain matters which they will likely view is necessarily relevant –
prior allegations (not proven) of for example criminal conduct, or in-
deed actual convictions for other types of crime than that which brings
an accused before court today –will be excluded from consideration. In-
deed, quite often, aspects of the history of a case which a psychothera-
pist might ﬁnd of particular explanatory interest, will not, from the
point of view of the law, be matters for the court.
In contrast, a TJ approach to judging brings the court room far closer
to the therapist's consultation room, valuing inputs and views which
would not previously have been admitted. It does this in part because
it seeks to do more than simply settle a case, but to achieve, as the ap-
proaches' title suggests, a therapeutic outcome. Even so, a difference re-
mains in that the goal of any litigation eventwill involve judgement and
the consideration of outcomes according to law.Whereas some analyses
may last for years, a tenet of the legal system is that delayed justice, de-
layed resolutions, may amount to a denial of justice.
Burt notes a third parallel in that:
On some occasions in therapy the patients do not acknowledge the
depth or even existence of inner conﬂict. The safe space provided
by the therapist and adroit, carefully timed interpretations offered
by the therapist as she listens to the patient's narrative can promote
conscious reﬂection on conﬂicted matters that the patient might
prefer to keep away from attention.
In respect of TJ, this analysis can provide recognition of and develop-
ment of the “court” as a safe place and the interactions within it as sup-
portive of conscious, structured, reﬂection. It is perhaps this parallel that
has the most profound implications for more traditional courts whereutic judging (TJ) of a psychoanalytical approach to the judicial role —
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appear to be “safe” and the complex and extensive interactions with
those involvedwith the courtmay not necessarily support conscious re-
ﬂection (andmay even prevent it). If a characteristic of TJ relates to this
feature then planning for and introducing TJ inmoremainstream courts
requires both recognition, and consideration, of the public nature of
court processes, the environment within which interactions take
place, and importantly the way that all those involved in the court pro-
cess interact so that “buried” conﬂict can be considered, and addressed
appropriately.
The ﬁfth parallel Burt notes as “atﬁrst glance appear[ing] to be a fun-
damental difference between judging and psychotherapy.” It is the,
“fearless willingness to listen to and to discuss anything, no matter
how aversive… often described as a nonjudgmental attitude on the
part of the therapist toward the patient.” In the judicial setting this is a
challenging and complex matter. Exposition of various matters might
involve self-incrimination (and could potentially for example result in
additional criminal charges). Burt's discussion is however more orient-
ed towards civil disputes, where such behaviours may carry less risk
(though risk of admissions against interest will remain). Burt suggests
that what is critical is that.
In the sameway that a psychotherapist assists the patient in coming
to recognize without fear or hostility the previously warring
portions of his mind, so too a judge can self-consciously attempt to
lead the warring litigants to recognize one another without fear or
hostility.
In the TJ setting, the judge plays a critical role in supporting recogni-
tion where possible. This involves direct discussion with disputants,
rather than interactions that are more directed at representatives. The
interactions of the entire team in a therapeutic court are also critical,
and recognition of the limitations of a court environment may assist to
ensure that the court remains a safe place in which such listening and
discussions can take place. From the perspective of TJ, the critical fea-
tures of this approach involve the judge carefully listening (with respect
and empathy) and being able to suspend judgement to support greater
recognition. Understanding this feature from a psychoanalytical per-
spective may again support, foster, and justify the expansion of TJ
approaches.
The sixth parallel Burt notes he also acknowledges might appear,
[At] ﬁrst glance to be a difference: The judge makes verbal inter-
pretations of the law; on its face, this is different from the
psychotherapist's appeal to the patient's agreement as the path to-
ward resolution of conﬂict in the patient's dividedmind. Itmight ap-
pear by contrast that the judge simply announces the law and
imposes it on the losing parties without regard to their agreement.
Burt characterises such a view as “conventional.”One can go further:
this may even misrepresent the judicial process. As many judges will
admit, a primary audience for their judgement will be the losing party
and a potential appeal court. They are the audiences which the judge
must persuade. If therewere awidespreadview, on the part of losing lit-
igants that a decision did not accord with a fair interpretation of the law
there would be a decline in public conﬁdence in the judicial system. In a
sense litigants allow their super-egos to suppress the rage of their
wronged id and ego, and to place their troubles in the hands of the
judge. As Burt notes, the conventional view ignores “a deeper sense
that the judge is… committed to soliciting the agreement of the losing
litigant.”
For his penultimate parallel Burt suggests that, “it is equally difﬁcult
for a therapist to distinguish between her personal psychological strug-
gles and the conﬂicts experienced by her patient” as it is for the judge to
distinguish between their personal views, and those of the wider com-
munity. This parallel deserves ampliﬁcation. An important part of thePlease cite this article as: Sourdin, T., & Cornes, R., Implications for therape
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to identify the distinct inﬂuence of the therapist or judge's personal as
opposed to their professional persona. Psychoanalysts themselves un-
dergo analysis as part of their training, and as Burt notes, they have
the concepts of transference and countertransference to assist in
explaining the themes and dynamicswhich emerge in their interactions
with analysands. Judges have the distinct legal psyche and defences of
splitting and repression to rely on to help maintain, at least consciously,
a perspective based on the law (embodying as it does the “communal
standards” to which Burt refers). A difference remains though. Unlike
psychoanalysts, judges traditionally have been much less interested in
self-reﬂection on this point, perhaps perceiving it to be beyond what
is required of the judicial role. It may also be that such self reﬂection is
even inconsistent with views relating to judicial independence or no-
tions of impartiality. Arguably though, a TJ approach requires judges
to reﬂect more on the social, as well as legal, dynamics of litigation
events, and further, on their own role within the litigation process.
Burt's ﬁnal parallel is that “whatever is said [by litigants, or analy-
sands] is important, but it is more important that the conﬂicts (between
the litigants or within the patient's dividedmind) are expressed in hos-
tile words rather than angry actions.” The courtroom, or therapist's of-
ﬁce, provides a “holding” space within which, as we suggested above,
disputing parties may “contain their emotions in order to be able to
think” (Craib, 2001, p. 5). A TJ approach to court processes will be a
much closer parallel given that it seeks not only to address legal con-
cerns, but also the wider issues which may be provoking or sustaining
the conﬂict before the court.
6. Conclusions
Psychoanalytical concepts should not be left, as Burt laments, to de-
partments of literary studies. These concepts have much to offer in de-
veloping contemporary techniques of justice. As he and others who
did not sound the retreat have shown, the concepts which began life
with SigmundFreud in Vienna at the endof the 1800shave thepotential
to stimulate debate and provide fresh points of embarkation for think-
ing about such challenges as: “what are judges, and courts, for? – and
are they trained, and designed appropriately for their roles?” –and
“how best should judicial operations be organised for the good of
society?”
The three factors Burt notes, at the outset of his discussion, as behind
the declining wider inﬂuence of psychoanalysis are now themselves
under challenge. Psychoactive drugs, whilst having efﬁcacy, and cer-
tainly being invaluable in many settings, are even now still often rela-
tively crude responses to “troubles of the mind.” Second, whilst
psychoanalytical conceptsmay still provoke debate, the high octane an-
tagonisms of the “controversial discussions” between the Anna Freud-
ians and Kleinians, whilst recalled and studied, are more a matter for
the history of psychoanalysis, than its current politics (see King &
Steiner, 1992). Those early dogmatic, at times antagonistic, positions
arose in part because the new ﬁeld of psychoanalysis was one which
often perceived itself as being under siege. In the early twenty ﬁrst cen-
tury Freud's concepts have proven their longevity, partly by preserving
their potential to cause controversy.
Of the third weakness Burt notes – psychoanalysis' inability to show
itself subject to scientiﬁc proof – we now have the burgeoning ﬁeld of
neuropsychoanalysis, pioneered by dual qualiﬁed pioneers such as the
South African, Mark Solms (see for e.g., Solms, 2015). This last develop-
ment, together with returning psychoanalytical ideas to, amongst other
places in the broader academy, including law schools, has great poten-
tial for future work.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is an obvious area for greater use of psy-
choanalytical concepts. Viewing TJ approaches from a psychoanalytical
perspective may suggest ways TJ concepts can be expanded from the
arenas it has already reached, or within arenas it has reached, where it
might still be improved. Importantly, much can also be gained fromutic judging (TJ) of a psychoanalytical approach to the judicial role —
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psychoanalysis. In this regard, the shift of the therapist from amore au-
thoritarian ﬁgure who holds the answers, to a more collaborative prac-
titioner who values not only input but engagement at a deeper level,
enables us also to consider how judges and judicial processes have
changed over the same time period.
The pioneering work of those engaged in TJ, when considered in the
context of the parallels between judges and therapists, reveals that TJ
also requires similar shifts in thinking and action. In addition, the
thoughtful comparative analysis by Burt suggests areas of focus and po-
tential concern, particularly where TJ is developed in mainstream
courts, and where the environment or “safe place”may be sub optimal.
Interactions required, by open justice principles, to take place in public
arguably require more connective approaches and additional “safe”
supports if TJ is to be therapeutic and this requires judges to do and be
engaged in ground breaking work.
In another area of parallel, pioneering scholars such as Robert Burt,
who was prepared from his early days in the academy to venture into
and engage with novel interdisciplinary adventures are to be
applauded. Such voyages can enrich both us and the discipline involved.
Scholars such as Burt help remind us that there is more than one per-
spective on any event. They can disrupt, confound, and inspire. They re-
mind us that “there are more things in heaven and earth… than are
dreamt of in [our] philosophies.”2
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